We introduce a model where social norms of voting participation are strategically chosen by competing political parties and determine voters' turnout. Social norms must be enforced …
Abstract Models of two contestants exerting effort to win a prize are very common and widely used in political economy. The contest success function plays as fundamental a role in the …
This is a book about a theory of social mechanisms and the behavior of groups. Our focus is on applications to democracy and lobbying. The evidence suggests to us that economic …
J Block, R Dutta, D Levine - Available at SSRN 4513819, 2023 - papers.ssrn.com
We propose a model where competing leaders influence the social norm adopted in their group provided it is optimal for their members. Individuals are instrumental in enforcing such …
A cikk arra keresi a választ, hogy kialakulhat-e koopetitív hálózatban (riválisok hálózatszerű együttműködésében) a kollúzió (a piaci versenyre káros összejátszás). A kérdés …
We study games of conflict (among groups or countries) where players can choose to fight or cooperate. We consider games where conflict is detrimental, that is where the average …
We introduce a model of turnout where social norms, strategically chosen by competing political parties, determine voters' participation. When the cost of enforcement of social …
We propose a simple model to study why in societies consisting of two distinct groups with their own norms some achieve consensus while others contend with conflicting norms. In …
This paper focuses on the question of whether collusion could appear in a coopetitive network (rivals' collaboration). Do the coopetitive networks cause collusion in reality? In …