Game theory for cyber security and privacy
In this survey, we review the existing game-theoretic approaches for cyber security and
privacy issues, categorizing their application into two classes, security and privacy. To show …
privacy issues, categorizing their application into two classes, security and privacy. To show …
Collusion-resilience in transaction fee mechanism design
Users bid in a transaction fee mechanism (TFM) to get their transactions included and
confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of …
confirmed by a blockchain protocol. Roughgarden (EC'21) initiated the formal treatment of …
But why does it work? A rational protocol design treatment of bitcoin
An exciting recent line of work has focused on formally investigating the core cryptographic
assumptions underlying the security of Bitcoin. In a nutshell, these works conclude that …
assumptions underlying the security of Bitcoin. In a nutshell, these works conclude that …
What can cryptography do for decentralized mechanism design
Recent works of Roughgarden (EC'21) and Chung and Shi (SODA'23) initiate the study of a
new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design …
new decentralized mechanism design problem called transaction fee mechanism design …
Rational protocol design: Cryptography against incentive-driven adversaries
Existing work on" rational cryptographic protocols" treats each party (or coalition of parties)
running the protocol as a selfish agent trying to maximize its utility. In this work we propose a …
running the protocol as a selfish agent trying to maximize its utility. In this work we propose a …
Toward a game theoretic view of secure computation
Abstract We demonstrate how Game Theoretic concepts and formalism can be used to
capture cryptographic notions of security. In the restricted but indicative case of two-party …
capture cryptographic notions of security. In the restricted but indicative case of two-party …
Maximizing miner revenue in transaction fee mechanism design
Transaction fee mechanism design is a new decentralized mechanism design problem
where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the …
where users bid for space on the blockchain. Several recent works showed that the …
Fair computation with rational players
We consider the problem of fairness in two-party computation, where this means (informally)
that both parties should learn the correct output. A seminal result of Cleve (STOC 1986) …
that both parties should learn the correct output. A seminal result of Cleve (STOC 1986) …
CheckMate: Automated Game-Theoretic Security Reasoning
LS Brugger, L Kovács, A Petkovic Komel… - Proceedings of the …, 2023 - dl.acm.org
We present the CheckMate framework for full automation of game-theoretic security
analysis, with particular focus on blockchain technologies. CheckMate analyzes protocols …
analysis, with particular focus on blockchain technologies. CheckMate analyzes protocols …
A brief survey on secure multi-party computing in the presence of rational parties
Intelligent agents (IA) are autonomous entities which observe through sensors and act upon
an environment using actuators to adjust their activities towards achieving certain goals. The …
an environment using actuators to adjust their activities towards achieving certain goals. The …