The paper proposes a game-theoretic model of interaction between investors and
innovators, taking into account the existence of so-called" fake" innovators offering …

Litigants settle in the shadow of the law, but they behave in the shadow of the settlement
outcome. Disparities in bargaining power drive a wedge between the shadow of the …

Most civil cases settle. Yet generating a definitive settlement rate presents complex
definitional and empirical problems, both in what should count as a settlement and how to …

We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly
disclosure of private information in a signaling game. Under the theory, 100% of plaintiffs …

We conduct an experimental analysis of discovery in both the signaling and screening
games, where in both games an uninformed defendant may engage in costly discovery …

We consider a simple model of litigation contests in which each party dedicates both “case-
advancing” efforts that directly increase her probability of winning, as well as “adversarial” …

The existence of lawsuits providing plaintiffs a negative expected value (NEV) at trial has
important theoretical implications for signaling models of litigation. The signaling equilibrium …

We conduct an experimental analysis of signaling games using three models of arbitration.
In the signaling model, the informed party in the dispute makes a settlement demand to the …

We develop a signaling model of final-offer arbitration (FOA) in which the informed party
makes the final settlement demand to the uninformed party. In FOA, each party submits a …

We conduct an experimental analysis of pretrial bargaining, while allowing for the costly
voluntary disclosure of private information in a screening game. In this game, the theoretical …