This paper studies the role of information asymmetries in second price, common value
auctions. Motivated by information structures that arise commonly in applications such as …

We study whether an auctioneer should let bidders see their opponents' identities in a
common-value second-price auction when bidders are uncertain about whether their …

We study two-player common-value all-pay auctions in which the players have ex-ante
asymmetric information represented by finite connected partitions of the set of states of …

We show that under standard assumptions every member of a broad class of generalized
Tullock contests with asymmetric information has a pure strategy Bayesian Nash …

We consider common-value hybrid auctions among two asymmetrically informed bidders,
where the winning bidder pays his bid with some positive probability k and the losing bid …

This paper introduces a game-theoretic analysis of auction settings where bidders' private
values depend on an uncertain common value, and the auctioneer has the option to …

We study how ex ante information asymmetries affect revenue in common-value second-
price auctions, motivated by online advertising auctions where “cookies” inform individual …

We study a discrete common-value auction environment with two asymmetrically informed
bidders. Equilibrium of the first-price auction is in mixed strategies, which we characterize …

We study a class of two-player common-value all-pay auctions (contests) with asymmetric
information under the assumption that one of the players has an information advantage over …

When players' affiliated values are symmetrically distributed, expected revenue in the
second-price auction equals or exceeds that in the first-price auction (Milgrom and Weber …