Stable fractional matchings

I Caragiannis, A Filos-Ratsikas… - Proceedings of the …, 2019 - dl.acm.org
We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal
preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After …

Strategyproof Matching of Roommates and Rooms

H Hosseini, S Narang, S Roy - arXiv preprint arXiv:2412.13887, 2024 - arxiv.org
We initiate the study of matching roommates and rooms wherein the preferences of agents
over other agents and rooms are complementary and represented by Leontief utilities. In this …

On Achieving Leximin Fairness and Stability in Many-to-One Matchings

S Narang, A Biswas, Y Narahari - arXiv preprint arXiv:2009.05823, 2020 - arxiv.org
The past few years have seen a surge of work on fairness in allocation problems where
items must be fairly divided among agents having individual preferences. In comparison …