RA Lambert - Journal of accounting and economics, 2001 - Elsevier
This paper reviews agency theory and its application to accounting issues. I discuss the formulation of models of incentive problems caused by moral hazard and adverse selection …
J Azar, MC Schmalz, I Tecu - The Journal of Finance, 2018 - Wiley Online Library
Many natural competitors are jointly held by a small set of large institutional investors. In the US airline industry, taking common ownership into account implies increases in market …
We present a mechanism based on managerial incentives through which common ownership affects product market outcomes. Firm-level variation in common ownership …
We review recent literature on the role of financial reporting transparency in reducing governance-related agency conflicts among managers, directors, and shareholders, as well …
ZY Brown, A MacKay - American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2023 - aeaweb.org
We document new facts about pricing technology using high-frequency data, and we examine the implications for competition. Some online retailers employ technology that …
This is the first book to provide a systematic treatment of the economics of antitrust (or competition policy) in a global context. It draws on the literature of industrial organisation …
Both managerial ownership and performance are endogenously determined by exogenous (and only partly observed) changes in the firm's contracting environment. We extend the …
By committing to terminate funding if a firm's performance is poor, investors can mitigate managerial incentive problems. These optimal financial constraints, however, encourage …