English summary: Lars P. Feld evaluates the economic arguments for or against tax competition in a federal polity and summarizes the empirical evidence concerned with the …
T Besley, A Case - Journal of Economic Literature, 2003 - aeaweb.org
A rich array of institutional diversity makes the United States an excellent place to study the relationship between political institutions and public policy outcomes. This essay has three …
J Rodden - International organization, 2003 - cambridge.org
This article revisits the influential “Leviathan” hypothesis, which posits that tax competition limits the growth of government spending in decentralized countries. I use panel data to …
Since the tax-sharing reform in 1994, the Chinese fiscal system has exhibited a marked vertical fiscal imbalance—a mismatch between expenditure and revenue assignments—at …
Bolivia decentralized in an effort to deepen democracy, improve public services, and make government more accountable. Unlike many countries, Bolivia succeeded. Over the past …
This article analyzes the efficiency of local governments in the Comunitat Valenciana (Spain) and their main explanatory variables. The analysis is performed in two stages …
E Stein - Journal of applied Economics, 1999 - Taylor & Francis
This paper explores the link between fiscal decentralization and government size in Latin America. While most related work attempts to test Brennan and Buchannan's “Liviathan” …
J Jin, H Zou - Journal of Urban Economics, 2002 - Elsevier
Beyond conducting the usual regression analysis of the relationship between fiscal decentralization and aggregate government size (national and subnational combined), this …
This paper analyzes one method governments employ to circumvent the discipline of a competitive system of fiscal federalism—intergovernmental collusion in the form of …