Epistemic game theory formalizes assumptions about rationality and mutual beliefs in a
formal language, then studies their behavioral implications in games. Specifically, it asks …

In this paper, we introduce a notion of continuous implementation and characterize when a
social choice function is continuously implementable. More specifically, we say that a social …

Weinstein and Yildiz (2007) have shown that in static games, only very weak predictions are
robust to perturbations of higher order beliefs. These predictions are precisely those …

We show that in any game that is continuous at infinity, if a plan of action ai is played by a
type ti in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then there are perturbations of ti for which ai is the …

Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable
strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an …

In the reputation literature, players have commitment types, which represent the possibility
that they do not have standard payoffs, but instead are constrained to follow a particular …

Ranking algorithms are the information gatekeepers of the Internet era. We develop a
stylized model to study the interplay between a ranking algorithm and individual clicking …

We analyze “nice” games (where action spaces are compact intervals, utilities continuous
and strictly concave in own action), which are used frequently in classical economic models …

Abstract Following Fudenberg et al.(1988) and Dekel and Fudenberg (1990), we say that a
refinement of (interim correlated) rationalizability is robust if it is prescribed by a solution …

[22] show that only very weak predictions are robust to misspecifications of higher order
beliefs. Whenever a type has multiple rationalizable actions, any of these actions is uniquely …