Rationalizability is a central concept in game theory. Since there may be many rationalizable
strategies, applications commonly use refinements to obtain sharp predictions. In an …

This paper characterizes generic equilibrium play in a multi-sender version of Crawford and
Sobel's (1982) cheap talk model, when robustness to a broad class of beliefs about noise in …

We study the strategic impact of players' higher-order uncertainty over the observability of
actions in general two-player games. More specifically, we consider the space of all belief …

Predictions under common knowledge of payoffs may differ from those under arbitrarily, but
finitely, many orders of mutual knowledge; Rubinstein's (1989) Email game is a seminal …

We study the strategic impact of players' higher order uncertainty over whether their actions
are observable to their opponents. We characterize the predictions of Rationality and …

Following the notion of continuous implementation, we consider a situation where the social
planner is not entirely sure of the validity of his model and thus wants the social choice …

In our main article, Miura and Yamashita (2014)(" On the possibility of information
transmission"), we have shown in a cheap-talk environment that" assuming full revelation in …

A large literature in game theory has studied the effects of perturbing common knowledge
assumptions on payoffs, from different perspectives (eg, Rubinstein (1989), Carlsson and …

We consider the generic robustness of an upper hemi-continuous solution concept on a
class of games of interest which has been embedded in a larger space of games. We show …

We extend significantly a result in Heifetz and Kets (Theor Econ 18: 415–465, 2018) for
Carlsson and van Damme's (Econometrica 61: 989–1018, 1993) global games by which …