This paper surveys the literature relevant for comparing centralized and decentralized
wholesale electricity markets. Under a centralized design, producers submit detailed cost …

Wholesale electricity markets have several features that increase the likelihood of collusion,
including frequent interaction, multimarket contact, and a high degree of information …

In centralized day-ahead markets, producers submit detailed cost data to the market
operator that decides how much should be produced in each plant. This differs from …

Zonal pricing with countertrading (a market-based redispatch) gives arbitrage opportunities
to the power producers located in the export-constrained nodes. They can increase their …

Using data from Alberta's wholesale electricity market, we demonstrate the challenges that
can arise when characterizing a firm's unilateral expected profit-maximizing offer curve. We …

In this paper, we construct an optimal price design mechanism to determine the equilibrium
in the day-ahead electricity market, specifically aimed at solving the uncomfortable conflict …

We study a market with sellers that compete in supply functions, face an elastic demand, and
have imperfect cost information. In our model, sellers neglect some informational content of …

Cournot models of oligopolistic interaction in forward and spot markets have shown that
firms may sell forward for risk-hedging reasons only, or for both risk-hedging and strategic …

Supply function equilibrium models are used to study electricity market auctions with
uncertain demand. We study the effects on the supply function equilibrium of a tax, levied by …

We analyze the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on electricity consumption patterns. We
highlight the importance of decomposing total electricity consumption into consumption by …