The “full commitment” assumption in the Bayesian persuasion literature might not always
hold: the sender might be tempted to deviate from an information structure to which he …

We study the optimal design of tests with manipulable inputs. Tests take a unidimensional
state of the world as input and output, an informative signal to guide a receiver's approve or …

We consider a Bayesian persuasion model, in which the receiver can gather independent
information about the state at a uniformly posterior-separable cost. We show that the sender …

We analyze the optimal mix of ex ante experimentation and ex post learning for the dynamic
adoption of activities with uncertain payoffs in a two-phase model of information diffusion. In …

Interacting agents receive public information at no cost and flexibly acquire private
information at a cost proportional to entropy reduction. When a policymaker provides more …

I study the persuasion of a receiver who accesses information only if she exerts costly
attention effort. The sender designs an experiment to persuade the receiver to take a specific …

This paper investigates how a sender, by providing free information to a perfectly rational
receiver, can manipulate the receiver's learning (change the receiver's learning outcome) …

We study the optimal design of tests with manipulable inputs: data, actions, reports. An agent
can, at a cost, falsify the input into the test, or state of the world, so as to influence the …

This paper studies public information disclosure in games with rationally inattentive players.
We establish how the existence of an optimal sender's strategy depends on the nature of the …

We examine the Bayesian persuasion of a long-run decision maker by a long-run
information designer. Each period until a deadline is reached the decision maker can …