Behavioral contract theory

B Kőszegi - Journal of Economic Literature, 2014 - aeaweb.org
This review provides a critical survey of psychology-and-economics (“behavioral-
economics”) research in contract theory. First, I introduce the theories of individual decision …

Testing for adverse selection in insurance markets

A Cohen, P Siegelman - Journal of Risk and insurance, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
This article reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance
markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage–risk prediction of …

Adverse selection and inertia in health insurance markets: When nudging hurts

BR Handel - American Economic Review, 2013 - aeaweb.org
This paper investigates consumer inertia in health insurance markets, where adverse
selection is a potential concern. We leverage a major change to insurance provision that …

Health insurance for “humans”: Information frictions, plan choice, and consumer welfare

BR Handel, JT Kolstad - American Economic Review, 2015 - aeaweb.org
Traditional models of insurance choice are predicated on fully informed and rational
consumers protecting themselves from exposure to financial risk. In practice, choosing an …

[图书][B] Development economics

D Ray - 1998 - books.google.com
A landmark textbook on development economics The study of development in low-income
countries is attracting more attention around the world than ever before. Yet until now there …

The myth of the rational voter: why democracies choose bad policies-new edition

B Caplan - The myth of the rational voter, 2011 - degruyter.com
The greatest obstacle to sound economic policy is not entrenched special interests or
rampant lobbying, but the popular misconceptions, irrational beliefs, and personal biases …

Barriers to household risk management: Evidence from India

S Cole, X Giné, J Tobacman, P Topalova… - American Economic …, 2013 - pubs.aeaweb.org
Why do many households remain exposed to large exogenous sources of nonsystematic
income risk? We use a series of randomized field experiments in rural India to test the …

Selection on moral hazard in health insurance

L Einav, A Finkelstein, SP Ryan, P Schrimpf… - American Economic …, 2013 - aeaweb.org
We use employee-level panel data from a single firm to explore the possibility that
individuals may select insurance coverage in part based on their anticipated behavioral …

Sorting things out: Valuation of new firms in uncertain markets

WG Sanders, S Boivie - Strategic Management Journal, 2004 - Wiley Online Library
New business models combined with a lack of objective operating data result in significant
information asymmetry and uncertainty in the valuation of new firms in emerging markets …

The wrong kind of transparency

A Prat - American economic review, 2005 - pubs.aeaweb.org
There is a widespread perception, especially among economists, that agency relationships
should be as transparent as possible. By transparency, we mean the ability of the principal …