Normative accounts of the correctness of belief have often been misconstrued. The norm of
truth for belief is a constitutive norm which regulates our beliefs through ideals of reason. I try …

I argue that explanations of doxastic transparency which go via an appeal to an aim or norm
of belief are problematic. I offer a new explanation which appeals to a biological function of …

Subjects take something to provide reason for believing that p only if it seems to provide
evidence that p. If evidentialism is the thesis that only evidence provides reason for …

There are mental actions, and a number of epistemic attitudes involve activity. But can there
be epistemic agency? I argue that there is a limit to any claim that we can be epistemic …

Sosa takes epistemic normativity to be kind of performance normativity: a belief is correct
because a believer sets a positive value to truth as an aim and performs aptly and adroitly. I …

If belief has an aim by being a (quasi) intentional activity, then it ought to be the case that the
aim of belief can be weighed against other aims one might have. However, this is not so with …

According to doxastic absolutism, there is a norm of truth constitutive of both the state and
the concept of belief. Two prominent arguments in favor of this view are i) that the distinction …

Normativists argue that the mind is essentially normative and any adequate account of our
mental attitudes must involve normative terms and judgments. In particular, one brand of …

One dimension along which it is tempting to characterize some mental disorders is
irrationality. The two ways of understanding the irrationality of delusion in particular are in …

In this paper, I discuss whether different interpretations of the aim of belief–both the
teleological and normative interpretations–have the resources to explain certain descriptive …