To believe something, as contemporary analytic philosophers generally use the term
“belief,” is to take it to be the case or regard it as true. In this sense, many of our beliefs are …

Sanford C. Goldberg argues in this volume that epistemic normativity-the sort of normativity
implicated in assessments of whether a belief amounts to knowledge-is grounded in the …

Delusions are a heterogenous transdiagnostic phenomenon with a higher prevalence in
schizophrenia. One of the most fundamental debates surrounding the philosophical …

Psychopathological delusions have a number of features that are curiously difficult to
explain. Delusions are resistant to counterevidence and impervious to counterargument …

What sort of mental state is a delusion? What causes delusions? Why are delusions
pathological? This book examines these questions, which are normally considered …

According to the doxastic model, delusions are beliefs. In the metacognitive model,
delusions are imaginings mistaken for beliefs. I argue that endorsement of false second …

Clinicians and cognitive scientists typically conceive of delusions as doxastic—they view
delusions as beliefs. But some philosophers have countered with anti‐doxastic objections …

The Capgras delusion is a condition in which a person believes that an imposter has
replaced some close friend or relative. Recent theorists have appealed to Bayesianism to …

The chapter focuses on whether one should be doxasticist about delusion. It has the
following structure. First, we will consider the nature of belief. The conclusion of the first …

Self-deception poses serious difficulties for belief attribution because the behavior of the self-
deceived is deeply conflicted: some of it supports the attribution of a certain belief, while …