Two-sided reputation in certification markets
In a market where sellers solicit certification to overcome asymmetric information, we show
that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a …
that the profit of a monopolistic certifier can be hump-shaped in its reputation for accuracy: a …
Belief precision and effort incentives in promotion contests
J Miklós‐Thal, H Ullrich - The Economic Journal, 2015 - academic.oup.com
The career concerns literature predicts that incentives for effort decline as beliefs about
ability become more precise (Holmström, 1982, 1999). In contrast, we show that effort can …
ability become more precise (Holmström, 1982, 1999). In contrast, we show that effort can …
Credit ratings and security design
J Josepson, J Shapiro - 2014 - nasdaq.com
The poor performance of credit ratings on structured finance products leading up to the
financial crisis has prompted investigation into the role of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in …
financial crisis has prompted investigation into the role of Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) in …