The literature on game theory and fisheries is reviewed, beginning with the initial papers
from the late 1970s on cooperative and noncooperative games. Later developments …

The tools of environmental economics guide policymakers as they weigh development
against nature, present against future, and certain benefits against uncertain consequences …

Historically, all capture fisheries have proven hard to manage; internationally shared stocks
face an additional impediment to effective management. Previous fisheries studies estimate …

This chapter reviews non-cooperative and cooperative game theoretic models applied to the
economics and management of multi-agent fisheries. We first compare two-player static and …

In this paper the management of straddling fish stocks is approached through a coalition
game in partition function form. A two-stage game is applied, assuming ex ante symmetric …

The sharing of a migrating fish stock between two players is considered. Data on the
Northeast Atlantic mackerel are used to model the fishery. A growth function is estimated …

The high seas fisheries are troubled by overcapacity and lax enforcement of management
rules. The idea has emerged that these problems could be dealt with by property rights …

It is now widely recognized that climactic regime shifts, which aperiodically alter a harvested
fish stock's biomass and spatial distribution, may lead to distorted fisheries management …

The 1993 UN Straddling Stock Agreement prescribes a multi-national organizational
structure for management of an exploited marine fish stock, one whose range straddles …

Shared fish stocks migrate across borders between different countries' exclusive economic
zones. This paper discusses the individual rationality of fish-sharing agreements based on …