A celebrated impossibility result by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983) shows that any truthful
mechanism for two-sided markets that maximizes social welfare must run a deficit, resulting …

In an online random trading problem, m sellers and n buyers arrive in a random sequential
order to meet a decision maker. Each seller possesses an item and each buyer demands an …

We characterise the set of dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC), strongly budget
balanced (SBB), and ex-post individually rational (IR) mechanisms for the multi-unit bilateral …

The secretary problem has been a focus of extensive study with a variety of extensions that
offer useful insights into the theory of optimal stopping. The original solution is to set one …

We study a generalization of the secretary problem, where decisions do not have to be
made immediately upon candidates' arrivals. After arriving, each candidate stays in the …

The recent emergence of new successful two-sided online platforms has transformed the
concept of a marketplace. Numerous two-sided mechanism design problems, including …

In this work, we are studying Online Learning and its application in Online Auctions through
intermediation. These days, all transactions on modern platforms are conducted exclusively …

Auctions are a major field of interest in game theory and in the wider microeconomics area,
reflected by recognitions such as Nobel prizes to William Vickrey and Paul Milgrom. The …