This article reviews and evaluates the empirical literature on adverse selection in insurance
markets. We focus on empirical work that seeks to test the basic coverage–risk prediction of …

This chapter surveys a number of recent empirical studies that test for or evaluate the
importance of asymmetric information in insurance relationships. Our focus throughout is on …

The first goal of this paper is to provide a simple and general test of the presence of
asymmetric information in contractual relationships within a competitive context. We also …

This paper tests the predictions of adverse-selection models using data from the automobile
insurance market. I find that, in contrast to what recent research suggests, the evidence is …

Several recent articles on empirical contract theory and insurance have tested for a positive
correlation between coverage and ex post risk, as predicted by standard models of pure …

While the theoretical literature on contracts has been enormous since the seventies,
empirical tests of the theory have long remained scarce. However, new empirical work has …

This paper presents empirical results on moral hazard in demand for medical care, using a
longitudinal dataset on 4578 individuals followed during two years. The dataset contains two …

It is a widely held perception, although empirically contentious, that credit rationing is an
important phenomenon in the UK small business sector. In response to this perception the …

A standard problem of applied contracts theory is to empirically distinguish between adverse
selection and moral hazard. We show that dynamic insurance data allow to distinguish …

This paper exploits dynamic features of insurance contracts in the empirical analysis of
moral hazard. We first show that experience rating implies negative occurrence dependence …