Microarchitectural timing channels expose hidden hardware states though timing. We survey
recent attacks that exploit microarchitectural features in shared hardware, especially as they …

Address space layout randomization (ASLR) is an important first line of defense against
memory corruption attacks and a building block for many modern countermeasures. Existing …

The constant-time programming discipline is an effective countermeasure against timing
attacks, which can lead to complete breaks of otherwise secure systems. However, adhering …

Hardware Performance Counters (HPCs) have been available in processors for more than a
decade. These counters can be used to monitor and measure events that occur at the CPU …

We present a software approach to mitigate access-driven side-channel attacks that
leverage last-level caches (LLCs) shared across cores to leak information between security …

Timing-based side-channels play an important role in exposing the state of a process
execution on underlying hardware by revealing information about timing and access …

Cache-based attacks are a class of side-channel attacks that are particularly effective in
virtualized or cloud-based environments, where they have been used to recover secret keys …

Real-world cryptographic code is often written in a subset of C intended to execute in
constant-time, thereby avoiding timing side channel vulnerabilities. This C subset eschews …

Modern extensible web platforms like Facebook and Yammer depend on third-party
software to offer a rich experience to their users. Unfortunately, users running a third-party …

Physical device fingerprinting exploits hardware features to uniquely identify a machine.
This technique has been used for authentication, license binding, or attackers identification …