This article reports the results of an individual choice experiment designed to test the Nash
equilibrium predictions of the first-price sealed-bid auction. A subject faced in 100 auctions …

This study measures risk attitudes using two paid experiments: the Holt and Laury (2002)
procedure and a variation of the game show Deal or No Deal. The participants also …

In this paper, we study the behavior of individuals when facing two different, but incentive-
wise identical, institutions. We pair the first price auction with an equivalent lottery. Once a …

This paper develops a methodology for characterizing expected revenue from auctions
when bidders' types come from an arbitrary distribution. In particular, types may be …

This study proposes methods for determining the optimal lot sizes for sequential auctions
that are conducted to sell sizable quantities of an item. These auctions are fairly common in …

This paper studies the effect of endogenous entry in first-price private value auctions.
Subjects decide, simultaneously, whether to participate in an auction, or to claim an outside …

Vernon Smith shared the Nobel Prize in 2002 with Daniel Kahneman. This article surveys
Smith's contributions to economics. His early efforts led to greater understanding of markets …

In this paper, we study the existence of monotone equilibrium in first price auctions where
bidders have a three-dimensional private type, ie their private values, degrees of risk …

Overbidding, bidding more than risk-neutral Bayesian Nash Equilibrium, is a widely
observed phenomenon in virtually all experimental auctions. The scholars within the auction …

We report on a series of experiments that examine bidding behavior in first-price sealed bid
auctions with symmetric and asymmetric bidders. To study the extent of strategic behavior …