Optimal rates and efficient algorithms for online Bayesian persuasion
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational
receivers that take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the …
receivers that take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the …
Sequential information design: Learning to persuade in the dark
M Bernasconi, M Castiglioni… - Advances in …, 2022 - proceedings.neurips.cc
We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver …
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver …
Markov persuasion processes: Learning to persuade from scratch
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver
so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has …
so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has …
Regret minimization in online Bayesian persuasion: Handling adversarial receiver's types under full and partial feedback models
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender has to design a signaling scheme that
discloses the right amount of information so as to influence the behavior of a self-interested …
discloses the right amount of information so as to influence the behavior of a self-interested …
Public signaling in bayesian ad auctions
We study signaling in Bayesian ad auctions, in which bidders' valuations depend on a
random, unknown state of nature. The auction mechanism has complete knowledge of the …
random, unknown state of nature. The auction mechanism has complete knowledge of the …
Bayesian persuasion meets mechanism design: Going beyond intractability with type reporting
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information
so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing …
so as to influence the behavior of self-interested receivers. In the last years, a growing …
Online learning in sequential Bayesian persuasion: Handling unknown priors
We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver, through the provision of payoff-relevant …
influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver, through the provision of payoff-relevant …
[HTML][HTML] Increasing revenue in Bayesian posted price auctions through signaling
We study single-item single-unit Bayesian posted price auctions, where buyers arrive
sequentially and their valuations for the item being sold depend on a random, unknown …
sequentially and their valuations for the item being sold depend on a random, unknown …
Online Bayesian Persuasion Without a Clue
F Bacchiocchi, M Bollini, M Castiglioni… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2024 - arxiv.org
We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly
faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff …
faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff …
[PDF][PDF] Optimal Rates for Online Bayesian Persuasion
Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational
receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on …
receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on …