[PDF][PDF] Contests: Theory and topics

Q Fu, Z Wu - Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Economics and …, 2019 - researchgate.net
Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

Carrots and sticks: prizes and punishments in contests

B Moldovanu, A Sela, X Shi - Economic Inquiry, 2012 - Wiley Online Library
We study optimal contest design in situations where the designer can reward high
performance agents with positive prizes and punish low performance agents with negative …

The shape of luck and competition in winner‐take‐all tournaments

D Ryvkin, M Drugov - Theoretical Economics, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
In winner‐take‐all tournaments, agents' performance is determined jointly by effort and luck,
and the top performer is rewarded. We study the impact of the “shape of luck”—the details of …

Risk taking in contests and the role of carrots and sticks

SM Gilpatric - Economic Inquiry, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
We study contests in which contestants choose both work effort and the variance of output
(risk). Winner‐take‐all contests generate incentives for contestants to engage in costly risk …

Optimal allocations of prizes and punishments in Tullock contests

A Sela - International Journal of Game Theory, 2020 - Springer
We study Tullock contests with n symmetric players. We show that in a contest without an
exit option, if prizes and punishments (negative prizes) have the same cost, it is optimal for …

Tournament rewards and heavy tails

M Drugov, D Ryvkin - Journal of Economic Theory, 2020 - Elsevier
Heavy-tailed fluctuations are common in many environments, such as sales of creative and
innovative products or the financial sector. We study how the presence of heavy tails in the …

Strive to be first or avoid being last: An experiment on relative performance incentives

EG Dutcher, L Balafoutas, F Lindner, D Ryvkin… - Games and Economic …, 2015 - Elsevier
We utilize a laboratory experiment to compare effort provision under optimal tournament
contracts with different distributions of prizes which motivate agents to compete to be first …

Implementing optimal outcomes in social computing: A game-theoretic approach

A Ghosh, P Hummel - Proceedings of the 21st international conference …, 2012 - dl.acm.org
In many social computing applications such as online Q&A forums, the best contribution for
each task receives some high reward, while all remaining contributions receive an identical …

Multi-prize contests with risk-averse players

Q Fu, X Wang, Z Wu - Games and Economic Behavior, 2021 - Elsevier
This paper studies a multi-prize imperfectly discriminatory contest with symmetric risk-averse
contestants. Adopting a multi-winner nested Tullock contest model, we first establish the …

Promotion tournaments in market equilibrium

J Zábojník - Economic Theory, 2012 - Springer
This paper studies how promotion tournaments motivate workers to accumulate human
capital when wages are constrained by outside labor markets. Patient firms can retain some …