We compare three common dispute resolution processes–negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration–in the framework of Crawford and Sobel [V. Crawford, J. Sobel, Strategic …

This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were
conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study …

We provide a partial characterization of the set of outcome functions that can be supported
as perfect Bayesian equilibrium in the recommendation game described in [T. Yamashita …

107 shown in section “Correlated Equilibrium and Communication,” this property can be
given several precise statements according to the constraints imposed on the players' …

Aumann [1974] introduced the correlated equilibrium as a solution concept for games in
strategic form. Aumann [1987] showed that if players are Bayes rational (ie, maximize their …

This paper shows that the efficiency bound for communication equilibria identified by
Goltsman et al.(2009) in the leading example of the Crawford–Sobel model can be obtained …

We show that essentially every communication equilibrium of any finite Bayesian game with
two players can be implemented as a strategic form correlated equilibrium of an extended …

Abstract In the Crawford-Sobel (uniform, quadratic utility) cheap-talk model, we consider a
simple mediation scheme (a communication device) in which the informed agent reports one …

We consider sender-receiver games, where the sender and the receiver are two distinct
nodes in a communication network. Communication between the sender and the receiver is …

Interdependent-choice equilibrium is defined as an extension of correlated equilibrium in
which the mediator is able to choose the timing of her signals, and observe the actions taken …