While agency theory has long dominated corporate governance research, we suggest that
the common transplanting of the dyadic principal–agent problem into the corporate context …

Using a new measure of shareholder inattention constructed from exogenous industry
shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that firms with distracted shareholders are …

Constructing a comprehensive data set of financially distressed firms that restructured their
debts from 2000–2014, we find that firms with financial institutions' loan-equity simultaneous …

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We study the
implications of such dual holdings for corporate governance and firm decisionmaking by …

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We study the
implications of such dual holdings for corporate governance and firm decision-making. We …

Mutual fund families increasingly hold bonds and stocks from the same firm. We present
evidence that dual ownership allows firms to increase valuable investments and refinance …

The agency relationship is a contract in which one or more people (principal) orders another
person (agent) to perform a service on behalf of the principal and authorizes the agent to …

The development of the Industrial Revolution 4.0 brought changes to the adjustment of work
in humans, machines, technology and processes in various professional fields, including the …

Using a new measure of shareholder inattention based on exogenous industry shocks to
institutional investor portfolios, we document a positive and significant relation between firms …

Abstract Using Kempf, Manconi, and Spalt's (2017) measure of shareholder inattention,
constructed from exogenous industry shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that …