We consider the partitioning of a society into coalitions in purely hedonic settings, ie, where each player's payoff is completely determined by the identity of other members of her …
S Banerjee, H Konishi, T Sönmez - Social Choice and Welfare, 2001 - Springer
We analyze the core of a class of coalition formation game in which every player's payoff depends only on the members of her coalition. We first consider anonymous games and …
In-group favoritism is a central aspect of human behavior. People often help members of their own group more than members of other groups. Here we propose a mathematical …
The work we present in this article initiated the formal study of fractional hedonic games (FHGs), coalition formation games in which the utility of a player is the average value he …
This paper quantitatively analyzes the stability and breakup of nations. The tradeoff between increasing returns in the provision of public goods and the costs of greater cultural …
AJ McGann - Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2002 - journals.sagepub.com
This article develops a model of parties in multi-party systems. Instead of treating parties as vote-maximizing candidates able to take any position, parties are assumed to be controlled …
Coalition formation provides a versatile framework for analyzing cooperative behavior in multi-agent systems. In particular, hedonic coalition formation has gained considerable …
In this paper we relax two common assumptions that are made when studying coalition formation. The first is that any number of coalitions can be formed; the second is that any …
M Bernard, F Hett, M Mechtel - European Economic Review, 2016 - Elsevier
We model individual identification choice as a strategic group formation problem. When choosing a social group to identify with, individuals appreciate high social status and a …