Competitive situations resembling contests are ubiquitous in modern economic landscape.
In a contest, economic agents expend costly effort to vie for limited prizes, and they are …

Cash transactions for goods and services in which no receipts are issued greatly increase
the risk of tax evasion. Despite the availability of banking services and alternative payment …

This work develops a theoretical framework for a behavioral policy against indirect tax
evasion that is complementary to the classical deterrence approach. The policy provides …

We revisit the classical result that taxation of private consumption is distortionary and
therefore precludes the efficient provision of public goods. We introduce a nonlinear …

Lotteries are traditional instruments for fundraising in general. Morgan has shown that they
can also be very effective in the provision of a public good. However, a fair lottery can only …

In this paper we analyze how biased lotteries can be used to overcome the free-riding
problem in voluntary public good provision. We characterize the optimal combinations of …

We study two provisional fixed-prize mechanisms for funding public goods: an all-pay
auction and a lottery. In our setting, the public good is provided only if the participants' …

In this paper, we introduce nonlinear pricing of lottery tickets to the mechanism of Morgan
(2000), in which a lottery is used to finance the public good. In a model with n symmetric …

We develop a general framework to study contests, containing the well-known models of
Tullock (1980) and Lazear & Rosen (1981) as special cases. The contest outcome depends …

This paper considers a complete bipartite conflict network model with returns to scale
technology. We show that the impact of the returns to scale technology on agents' …