Several school districts use assignment systems that give students an incentive to
misrepresent their preferences. We find evidence consistent with strategic behavior in …

Matching problems under preferences have been studied widely in mathematics, computer
science and economics, starting with the seminal paper by Gale and Shapley (1962). A …

This paper studies how welfare outcomes in centralized school choice depend on the
assignment mechanism when participants are not fully informed. Using a survey of school …

An important but under-explored issue in student assignment procedures is heterogeneity in
the level of strategic sophistication among students. Our work provides the first direct …

The Boston mechanism is a school allocation procedure that is widely used around the
world and has been criticized for its incentive problems. In order to resolve overdemands for …

Student access to education levels, tracks or majors is usually determined by their previous
performance, measured either by internal exams, designed and graded by teachers in …

We take school admission mechanisms to the lab to test whether the widely-used
manipulable Immediate Acceptance mechanism disadvantages students of lower cognitive …

Choosing a specialty school involves huge challenges for families. This research aims to
understand the behavioral process that leads families to choose among various specialty …

We present partial strategyproofness, a new, relaxed notion of strategyproofness for
studying the incentive properties of non-strategyproof assignment mechanisms. Informally, a …

In one-sided matching/assignment problems, an important debate centers around whether it
is possible to improve upon the Gale-Shapley student-proposing deferred acceptance …