Following Kamenica and Gentzkow, this paper studies persuasion as an information design
problem. We investigate how mistakes in probabilistic inference impact optimal persuasion …

Attention costs can cause some information to be ignored and decisions to be imperfect.
Can we improve the material welfare of a rationally inattentive agent by restricting his …

We explore the deliberate infusion of ambiguity into the design of contracts. We show that
when the agent is ambiguity‐averse and hence chooses an action that maximizes their …

A sender designs an information structure to persuade a receiver to take an action. The
sender is ignorant about the receiver's prior, and evaluates each information structure using …

Decisions under uncertainty are often made with information whose interpretation is
uncertain because multiple interpretations are possible. Individuals may perceive and …

We study incomplete information games with ambiguity averse players. Our focus is on
equilibrium concepts satisfying sequential optimality—each player's strategy is optimal at …

A privately informed issuer raises project financing from an uninformed investor through a
security sale. The investor faces Knightian uncertainty and evaluates each security by the …

I study the problem of a persuader who proposes a set of models to manipulate how a
boundedly rational agent interprets observable signal realizations. The persuader does not …

With standard models of updating under ambiguity, new information may increase the
amount of relevant ambiguity: the set of beliefs may 'dilate.'We experimentally test one sharp …

This paper studies robust Bayesian persuasion of a privately informed receiver in a binary
environment, where an ambiguity-averse sender with a maxmin expected utility function has …