This paper studies a stability notion and matching processes in the job market with
incomplete information on the workers' side. Each worker is associated with a type, and …

We consider a many-to-one matching market where colleges share true preferences over
students but make decisions using only independent noisy rankings. Each student has a …

This paper introduces a novel measurement of informational size to school choice problems,
which inherits its ideas from Mount and Reiter (1974). This concept measures a matching …

I study a model of centralized school choice in which students engage in costly search over
schools before submitting preference reports to a clearinghouse. I consider three classes of …

We present a model that investigates preference evolution with endogenous matching. In
the short run, individuals' subjective preferences simultaneously determine who they choose …

Stability is a central concept in matching theory. We investigate the set of stable matchings in
a general environment that can accommodate both complete and incomplete information …

We propose a theory of cooperative games with incomplete information. The theory
concerns stable interactions that cannot be undermined by coalitions and is built on a …

It is well known that in the absence of transfers, stable matchings are positive assortative
when agents' preferences are strictly monotonic in each other's types and types are …

The decision-making of the agents in a matching is led by their preferences. Two-sided
matching with known preferences of the agents has been studied for a long time. Present …

Incomplete information can invalidate standard results on stable matchings, such as the
celebrated lone-wolf theorem, lattice theorem, and the comparative statics following new …