Optimal agency bias and regulatory review

R Bubb, PL Warren - The Journal of Legal Studies, 2014 - journals.uchicago.edu
Why do bureaucratic principals appoint agents who hold different policy views from
themselves? We posit an explanation based on the interplay between two types of agency …

Agency Design, Human Capital, and Political Control in US Federal Agencies

A Bolton - 2015 - dataspace.princeton.edu
The question of who controls what the bureaucracy does and how well it does it is central to
the study of American politics. Political actors rely on administrative action for the successful …

Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review

R Bubb, PL Warren - NYU School of Law, Public Law Research …, 2013 - papers.ssrn.com
Why do bureaucratic principals appoint agents who hold different policy views from
themselves? We posit an explanation based on the interplay between two types of agency …

Essays on the Cost-Benefit Administrative State

MB Chen - 2017 - escholarship.org
Cost-benefit analysis is today a cornerstone of American administrative law. Congress has
sometimes asked it of administrative agencies, the Army Corps of Engineers being an early …

Essays on Presidential and Congressional Oversight of the Executive Branch

JMK Rezaee - 2016 - escholarship.org
Given gridlock in Congress, presidents and subunits of Congress are increasingly pursuing
their policy goals in the executive branch. Yet we know little about how they go about doing …

[引用][C] Optimal Agency Bias and Regulatory Review

PL Kaplow, O Hart, H Spamann, K Spier - 2012