We consider vertical contracting arrangements between a manufacturer and a retailing
network when retailers have private information and the organization is run through bilateral …

Auctions are inherently risky: bidders face uncertainty about their prospects of winning and
payments, while sellers are unsure about revenue and chances of a successful sale. Auction …

Efficiency and optimality are the two primary and generally conflicting goals in any auction
design: the former focuses on the social welfare of the whole seller–bidder system, whereas …

This paper introduces a game-theoretic analysis of auction settings where bidders' private
values depend on an uncertain common value, and the auctioneer has the option to …

Motivated by vigorous development of keyword auctions, this paper analyzes the reserve
price policies in keyword auction with advertisers' endogenous investment and risk-averse …

The seminal work of Myerson (Mathematics of OR'81) characterizes incentive-compatible
single-item auctions among bidders with independent valuations. In this setting, relatively …

Suppose a principal can only sign public bilateral contracts with agents who have private
information on their costs of producing goods on his behalf. The principal may manipulate …

Within mechanism design, auctions are a major field of interest [12–14]. In this, we consider
a single auctioneer who wants to sell an item to one of several bidders, each of whom has a …

We investigate the consequences of assuming private communication between the principal
and each of his agents in an otherwise standard mechanism design setting. Doing so …

This article presents a non-expected utility decision model which is nonlinear in the winning
probabilities. The model not only explicitly expresses bidders' attitudes to risk, but also …