Multiple principals, multiple problems: Implications for effective governance and a research agenda for joint service delivery

B Voorn, M Van Genugten, S Van Thiel - Public administration, 2019 - Wiley Online Library
The multiple principal problem refers to multiple collective action problems that
organizations face when they must balance (competing) interests of multiple stakeholders …

[图书][B] Platform ecosystems: Aligning architecture, governance, and strategy

A Tiwana - 2013 - books.google.com
Platform Ecosystems is a hands-on guide that offers a complete roadmap for designing and
orchestrating vibrant software platform ecosystems. Unlike software products that are …

Contract law

BE Hermalin, AW Katz, R Craswell - Handbook of law and economics, 2007 - Elsevier
This chapter surveys major issues arising in the economic analysis of contract law. It begins
with an introductory discussion of scope and methodology, and then addresses four main …

[图书][B] Firms, contracts, and financial structure

O Hart - 1995 - books.google.com
This book provides a framework for thinking about economic instiutions such as firms. The
basic idea is that institutions arise in situations where people write incomplete contracts and …

Do formal contracts and relational governance function as substitutes or complements?

L Poppo, T Zenger - Strategic management journal, 2002 - Wiley Online Library
Relational exchange arrangements supported by trust are commonly viewed as substitutes
for complex contracts in interorganizational exchanges. Many argue that formal contracts …

Trust and collaboration in the aftermath of conflict: The effects of contract structure

D Malhotra, F Lumineau - Academy of management Journal, 2011 - journals.aom.org
Leveraging a longitudinal data set concerning 102 interfirm disputes, we evaluate the effects
of contract structure on trust and on the likelihood of continued collaboration. We …

Relational Contracts and the Theory of the Firm

G Baker, R Gibbons, KJ Murphy - The Quarterly Journal of …, 2002 - academic.oup.com
Relational contracts—informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships—
are prevalent within and between firms. We develop repeated-game models showing why …

Competence-and integrity-based trust in interorganizational relationships: which matters more?

BL Connelly, TR Crook, JG Combs… - Journal of …, 2018 - journals.sagepub.com
Trust is an important factor for managing transaction costs within interorganizational
relationships (IORs). Research on trust indicates that separate dimensions of trust arise from …

Governing buyer–supplier relationships through transactional and relational mechanisms: Evidence from China

Y Liu, Y Luo, T Liu - Journal of operations management, 2009 - Elsevier
Building on economic and social exchange theories, this study investigates the different
roles transactional and relational mechanisms have in hindering opportunism and improving …

Incomplete contracts: Where do we stand?

J Tirole - Econometrica, 1999 - Wiley Online Library
The paper takes stock of the advances and directions for research on the incomplete
contracting front. It first illustrates some of the main ideas of the incomplete contract literature …