Merchants are wary of a platform's competitive entry reducing sales and margins. Profit-
maximizing platforms seek to provide credible quality information to gain consumer trust and …

We model the widespread failure of contracts to share risk using available indices. A
borrower and lender can share risk by conditioning repayments on an index. The lender has …

Financial over-the-counter markets have been traditionally very opaque. Recent regulation
promotes transparency in some of these markets by lowering search costs, allowing traders …

Addressing environmental and public health problems requires concerted efforts from both
the government and its citizens. The government typically has more information than the …

I study a multi-sender signaling game between an uninformed decision maker and two
senders with common private information and conflicting interests. Senders can misreport …

We introduce a new solution concept called strong forward induction which is implied by
strategic stability in generic finite multi-sender signaling games (Proposition 1) and can be …

We study how policy choice and political selection are affected by the concentration of
political power. In a setting with inefficient policy gambles, variations in power concentration …

Short sellers convey negative information to securities lenders when borrowing shares. I
model how this information generates novel interactions between institutional investors' …

This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two
perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a …

This paper addresses the issue of risky shifts by a multi-sender signaling game. Senders
compete in making proposals to be adopted by a group, hence they try to signal that they …