A systematic review of research on sustainability in mergers and acquisitions

T González-Torres, JL Rodríguez-Sánchez… - Sustainability, 2020 - mdpi.com
The field of mergers and acquisitions and sustainability has been expanding in the last
years; consequently, there is a need for a systematic review of the existing body of …

Antitrust policy toward horizontal mergers

MD Whinston - Handbook of industrial organization, 2007 - Elsevier
Recently there has been a notable increase in interest in antitrust law in much of the world.
This chapter discusses antitrust policy toward horizontal mergers, the area of antitrust that …

Cyber Strategy: The Evolving Character of Power and Coercion

B Valeriano - 2018 - academic.oup.com
Some pundits claim cyber weaponry is the most important military innovation in decades, a
transformative new technology that promises a paralyzing first-strike advantage difficult for …

[图书][B] The economics of collusion: Cartels and bidding rings

RC Marshall, LM Marx - 2012 - books.google.com
An examination of collusive behavior: what it is, why it is profitable, how it is implemented,
and how it might be detected. Explicit collusion is an agreement among competitors to …

[PDF][PDF] Detecting cartels

JE Harrington - 2005 - econstor.eu
Detecting cartels Page 1 Harrington, Joseph E. Working Paper Detecting cartels Working Paper,
No. 526 Provided in Cooperation with: Department of Economics, The Johns Hopkins University …

Collusion, mergers, and related antitrust issues

J Asker, V Nocke - Handbook of industrial organization, 2021 - Elsevier
This chapter examines recent developments in economic research relating to antitrust,
paying specific attention to research in the areas of collusion and merger enforcement …

Endogenous cartel formation with heterogeneous firms

I Bos, JE Harrington, Jr - The RAND Journal of Economics, 2010 - Wiley Online Library
In the context of an infinitely repeated capacity‐constrained price game, we endogenize the
composition of a cartel when firms are heterogeneous in their capacities. When firms are …

Oligopolistic price leadership and mergers: The united states beer industry

NH Miller, G Sheu, MC Weinberg - American Economic Review, 2021 - aeaweb.org
We study a repeated game of price leadership in which a firm proposes supermarkups over
Bertrand prices to a coalition of rivals. Supermarkups and marginal costs are recoverable …

Measuring the incentive to collude: the vitamin cartels, 1990–99

M Igami, T Sugaya - The Review of Economic Studies, 2022 - academic.oup.com
Do mergers help or hinder collusion? This article studies the stability of the vitamin cartels in
the 1990s and presents a repeated-games approach to quantify “coordinated effects” of a …

Optimal collusion under cost asymmetry

J Miklos-Thal - Economic Theory, 2011 - Springer
Cost asymmetry is generally thought to hinder collusion because a more efficient firm has
both more to gain from deviations and less to fear from retaliation than less efficient firms …