The theory of learning in games explores how, which, and what kind of equilibria might arise as a consequence of a long-run nonequilibrium process of learning, adaptation, and/or …
AE Roth, I Erev - Games and economic behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does …
GJ Mailath - Journal of Economic Literature, 1998 - JSTOR
AT THE SAME TIME that noncooperative game theory has become a standard tool in economics, it has also come under increasingly critical scrutiny from theorists and …
GJ Mailath, L Samuelson - Handbook of Game Theory with Economic …, 2015 - Elsevier
This paper surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information. We first develop the adverse-selection approach to reputations in the context of a long-lived …
Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a …
JH Nachbar - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1997 - JSTOR
Consider a two-player discounted repeated game in which each player optimizes with respect to a prior belief about his opponent's repeated game strategy. One would like to …
We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of …
We examine the local stability of mixed equilibria in a smoothed fictitious play model. Our model is easy to analyze and yields the same conclusions as other models in 2× 2 games …
G Ellison - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
The paper examines a large population analog of fictitious play in which players learn from personal experience, focusing on what happens when a single rational player is added to …