[图书][B] The theory of learning in games

D Fudenberg, DK Levine - 1998 - books.google.com
In economics, most noncooperative game theory has focused on equilibrium in games,
especially Nash equilibrium and its refinements. The traditional explanation for when and …

Learning and equilibrium

D Fudenberg, DK Levine - Annu. Rev. Econ., 2009 - annualreviews.org
The theory of learning in games explores how, which, and what kind of equilibria might arise
as a consequence of a long-run nonequilibrium process of learning, adaptation, and/or …

Learning in extensive-form games: Experimental data and simple dynamic models in the intermediate term

AE Roth, I Erev - Games and economic behavior, 1995 - Elsevier
We use simple learning models to track the behavior observed in experiments concerning
three extensive form games with similar perfect equilibria. In only two of the games does …

Do people play Nash equilibrium? Lessons from evolutionary game theory

GJ Mailath - Journal of Economic Literature, 1998 - JSTOR
AT THE SAME TIME that noncooperative game theory has become a standard tool in
economics, it has also come under increasingly critical scrutiny from theorists and …

Reputations in repeated games

GJ Mailath, L Samuelson - Handbook of Game Theory with Economic …, 2015 - Elsevier
This paper surveys work on reputations in repeated games of incomplete information. We
first develop the adverse-selection approach to reputations in the context of a long-lived …

Conditional universal consistency

D Fudenberg, DK Levine - Games and Economic Behavior, 1999 - Elsevier
Players choose an action before learning an outcome chosen according to an unknown and
history-dependent stochastic rule. Procedures that categorize outcomes, and use a …

Prediction, optimization, and learning in repeated games

JH Nachbar - Econometrica: Journal of the Econometric Society, 1997 - JSTOR
Consider a two-player discounted repeated game in which each player optimizes with
respect to a prior belief about his opponent's repeated game strategy. One would like to …

Superstition and rational learning

D Fudenberg, DK Levine - American Economic Review, 2006 - aeaweb.org
We argue that some, but not all, superstitions can persist when learning is rational and
players are patient, and illustrate our argument with an example inspired by the Code of …

Learning purified mixed equilibria

G Ellison, D Fudenberg - Journal of Economic Theory, 2000 - Elsevier
We examine the local stability of mixed equilibria in a smoothed fictitious play model. Our
model is easy to analyze and yields the same conclusions as other models in 2× 2 games …

Learning from personal experience: One rational guy and the justification of myopia

G Ellison - Games and Economic Behavior, 1997 - Elsevier
The paper examines a large population analog of fictitious play in which players learn from
personal experience, focusing on what happens when a single rational player is added to …