[图书][B] Economics and computation

J Rothe - 2015 - Springer
1 Her work has been supported in part by an NRW grant for gender-sensitive universities
supporting her as a junior professor for Computational Social Choice and by the project …

Weighted voting on the blockchain: Improving consensus in proof of stake protocols

S Leonardos, D Reijsbergen… - International Journal of …, 2020 - Wiley Online Library
Proof of stake (PoS) protocols rely on voting mechanisms to reach consensus on the current
state. If an enhanced majority of staking nodes, also called validators, agree on a proposed …

[HTML][HTML] Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning

Y Bachrach, R Everett, E Hughes, A Lazaridou… - Artificial Intelligence, 2020 - Elsevier
When autonomous agents interact in the same environment, they must often cooperate to
achieve their goals. One way for agents to cooperate effectively is to form a team, make a …

Manipulating the quota in weighted voting games

M Zuckerman, P Faliszewski, Y Bachrach, E Elkind - Artificial Intelligence, 2012 - Elsevier
Weighted voting games provide a simple model of decision-making in human societies and
multi-agent systems. Such games are described by a set of players, a list of playersʼ …

A complexity approach for core-selecting exchange under conditionally lexicographic preferences

E Fujita, J Lesca, A Sonoda, T Todo, M Yokoo - Journal of Artificial …, 2018 - jair.org
Core-selection is a crucial property of rules in the literature of resource allocation. It is also
desirable, from the perspective of mechanism design, to address the incentive of agents to …

Designing all-pay auctions using deep learning and multi-agent simulation

I Gemp, T Anthony, J Kramar, T Eccles, A Tacchetti… - Scientific Reports, 2022 - nature.com
We propose a multi-agent learning approach for designing crowdsourcing contests and All-
Pay auctions. Prizes in contests incentivise contestants to expend effort on their entries, with …

False-name manipulations in weighted voting games

H Aziz, Y Bachrach, E Elkind, M Paterson - Journal of Artificial Intelligence …, 2011 - jair.org
Weighted voting is a classic model of cooperation among agents in decision-making
domains. In such games, each player has a weight, and a coalition of players wins the game …

[PDF][PDF] False-name-proof mechanism design without money

T Todo, A Iwasaki, M Yokoo - … Agents and Multiagent Systems-Volume 2, 2011 - ifaamas.org
Mechanism design studies how to design mechanisms that result in good outcomes even
when agents strategically report their preferences. In traditional settings, it is assumed that a …

Social ranking manipulability for the cp-majority, Banzhaf and lexicographic excellence solutions

T Allouche, B Escoffier, S Moretti… - Twenty-Ninth International …, 2021 - hal.science
We investigate the issue of manipulability for social ranking rules, where the goal is to rank
individuals given the ranking of coalitions formed by them and each individual prefers to …

[PDF][PDF] Misrepresentation in District Voting.

Y Bachrach, O Lev, Y Lewenberg, Y Zick - IJCAI, 2016 - cs.toronto.edu
Voting systems in which voters are partitioned to districts encourage accountability by
providing voters an easily identifiable district representative, but can result in a selection of …