This paper provides a literature overview on (direct revelation) algorithmic mechanism
design in the context of machine scheduling problems. Here, one takes a game-theoretic …

A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture Page 1 A Proof of the Nisan-Ronen Conjecture George
Christodoulou∗ Aristotle University of Thessaloniki School of Informatics and Archimedes/RC …

This paper presents inapproximability results for paradigmatic multi-dimensional truthful
mechanism design problems. We first show a lower bound of 2− 1 n for the scheduling …

The Nisan-Ronen conjecture states that no truthful mechanism for makespan-minimization
when allocating m tasks to n unrelated machines can have approximation ratio less than n …

The opportunistic utilization of access devices to offload mobile data from cellular network
has been considered as a promising approach to cope with the explosive growth of cellular …

We study the problem of truthfully scheduling m tasks to n selfish unrelated machines, under
the objective of makespan minimization, as was introduced in the seminal work of Nisan and …

In this article we survey the main research topics of our group at the University of Essex. Our
research interests lie at the intersection of theoretical computer science, artificial …

We study the trade-off between the price of anarchy (PoA) and the price of stability (PoS) in
mechanism design in the prototypical problem of unrelated machine scheduling. We give …

We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large
sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the …

We study the performance of anonymous posted-price selling mechanisms for a standard
Bayesian auction setting, where n bidders have iid valuations for a single item. We show that …