This paper discusses whether self-learning price-setting algorithms can coordinate their
pricing behavior to achieve a collusive outcome that maximizes the joint profits of the firms …

We estimate the impact of cartel organizational features, as well as macroeconomic
fluctuations and industry structure, on cartel duration using a data set of contemporary …

Suppose that providing incentives for a group of individuals in a strategic context requires a
monitor to detect their deviations. What about the monitor's deviations? To address this …

Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Private Monitoring | The Review of Economic Studies |
Oxford Academic Skip to Main Content Advertisement Oxford Academic Journals Books Search …

This paper studies partnerships that employ a mediator to improve their contractual ability.
Intuitively, profitable deviations must be attributable, that is, there must be some group …

In this paper, I offer two ways in which firms can collude: secret monitoring and infrequent
coordination. Such collusion is enforceable with intuitive communication protocols. I make …

Apple's economic role in the Publisher conspiracy to increase Amazon's below cost pricing
of e-books is examined in a hub-and-spoke conspiracy framework. The five major e-book …

Social and political inequality among individuals is a common driving force behind the
breakdown in cooperation. In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally study …

In a military tactical network, maintaining trust among members in a mission group is critical
to successful mission completion. However, maintaining high trust among group members in …

This paper studies the role of memory and communication in overlapping generations (OLG)
games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry …