Life is physics: evolution as a collective phenomenon far from equilibrium

N Goldenfeld, C Woese - Annu. Rev. Condens. Matter Phys., 2011 - annualreviews.org
Evolution is the fundamental physical process that gives rise to biological phenomena. Yet it
is widely treated as a subset of population genetics, and thus its scope is artificially limited …

Optimistic mirror descent in saddle-point problems: Going the extra (gradient) mile

P Mertikopoulos, B Lecouat, H Zenati, CS Foo… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2018 - arxiv.org
Owing to their connection with generative adversarial networks (GANs), saddle-point
problems have recently attracted considerable interest in machine learning and beyond. By …

Cycles in adversarial regularized learning

P Mertikopoulos, C Papadimitriou, G Piliouras - Proceedings of the twenty …, 2018 - SIAM
Regularized learning is a fundamental technique in online optimization, machine learning,
and many other fields of computer science. A natural question that arises in this context is …

An impossibility theorem in game dynamics

J Milionis, C Papadimitriou… - Proceedings of the …, 2023 - National Acad Sciences
The Nash equilibrium—a combination of choices by the players of a game from which no
self-interested player would deviate—is the predominant solution concept in game theory …

[图书][B] Population games and evolutionary dynamics

WH Sandholm - 2010 - books.google.com
A systematic, rigorous, comprehensive, and unified overview of evolutionary game theory.
This text offers a systematic, rigorous, and unified presentation of evolutionary game theory …

Evolutionary game dynamics

J Hofbauer, K Sigmund - Bulletin of the American mathematical society, 2003 - ams.org
Evolutionary game dynamics is the application of population dynamical methods to game
theory. It has been introduced by evolutionary biologists, anticipated in part by classical …

On last-iterate convergence beyond zero-sum games

I Anagnostides, I Panageas, G Farina… - International …, 2022 - proceedings.mlr.press
Most existing results about last-iterate convergence of learning dynamics are limited to two-
player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the …

α-Rank: Multi-Agent Evaluation by Evolution

S Omidshafiei, C Papadimitriou, G Piliouras, K Tuyls… - Scientific reports, 2019 - nature.com
We introduce α-Rank, a principled evolutionary dynamics methodology, for the evaluation
and ranking of agents in large-scale multi-agent interactions, grounded in a novel dynamical …

Scaling up mean field games with online mirror descent

J Perolat, S Perrin, R Elie, M Laurière… - arXiv preprint arXiv …, 2021 - arxiv.org
We address scaling up equilibrium computation in Mean Field Games (MFGs) using Online
Mirror Descent (OMD). We show that continuous-time OMD provably converges to a Nash …

Stochastic evolutionary game dynamics

A Traulsen, C Hauert - Reviews of nonlinear dynamics and …, 2009 - Wiley Online Library
Modern game theory goes back to a series of papers by the mathematician John von
Neumann in the 1920s. This program started a completely new branch of social sciences …