The implementation problem is the problem of designing a mechanism (game form) such
that the equilibrium outcomes satisfy a criterion of social optimality embodied in a social …

This review summarizes a nascent body of theoretical research on design of incentives
when the environment is not fully known to the designer and offers some general lessons …

When is record-keeping better arranged through a blockchain than through a traditional
centralized intermediary? The ideal qualities of any record-keeping system are (i) …

What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize
themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be …

The mechanism design literature assumes too much common knowledge of the environment
among the players and planner. We relax this assumption by studying mechanism design on …

This paper describes a general approach to constructing cooperative services that span
multiple administrative domains. In such environments, protocols must tolerate both …

A crash course in implementation theory Page 1 Soc Choice Welfare 2001) 18: 655±708 9999
2001 A crash course in implementation theory Matthew O. Jackson Humanities and Social …

Quantal Response Equilibrium presents a stochastic theory of games that unites
probabilistic choice models developed in psychology and statistics with the Nash …

This paper studies a dynamic agency problem which includes limited liability, moral hazard,
and adverse selection. The paper develops a robust approach to dynamic contracting based …

In recent years, the designs of many new blockchain applications have been inspired by the
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) problem. While traditional BFT protocols assume that most …