We consider a large class of social learning models in which a group of agents face
uncertainty regarding a state of the world, share the same utility function, observe private …

We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational
learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based …

This paper studies a social learning game where some agents independently learn how to
defect---a privately profitably but socially harmful action---while the rest can only learn by …

We model a public goods game with groups, position uncertainty, and observational
learning. Contributions are simultaneous within groups, but groups play sequentially based …

I study information aggregation among opinion leaders, who have access to private
information, observe their predecessor's move, and care about both taking a correct action …

We study observational learning among agents with coordination motives. On a discrete
time line, communities of agents receive private information about an uncertain state …

We study long-lived rational agents who learn through experimentation and observing each
other's actions. Experimentation and social learning, even when combined, often lead to …

Fragility of Confounded Learning arXiv:2106.07712v1 [econ.TH] 14 Jun 2021 Page 1 Fragility
of Confounded Learning Xuanye Wang ∗ Institute for Advanced Economics Research, Dongbei …

We model a dynamic public good contribution game, where players are (naturally) formed
into groups. The groups are exogenously placed in a sequence, with limited information …