Computational social choice

F Brandt, V Conitzer, U Endriss - Multiagent systems, 2012 - books.google.com
Social choice theory concerns the design and formal analysis of methods for aggregating
the preferences of multiple agents. Examples of such methods include voting procedures …

Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders

L Xia, V Conitzer - Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research, 2011 - jair.org
Usually a voting rule requires agents to give their preferences as linear orders. However, in
some cases it is impractical for an agent to give a linear order over all the alternatives. It has …

AI's war on manipulation: Are we winning?

P Faliszewski, AD Procaccia - AI Magazine, 2010 - ojs.aaai.org
AI Magazine Page 1 It was a late evening in Bitotia. The next day was going to be a big day:
Citizens of Bitotia would once and for all establish which byte order was better, big-endian (B) …

[图书][B] Economics and computation

J Rothe - 2015 - Springer
1 Her work has been supported in part by an NRW grant for gender-sensitive universities
supporting her as a junior professor for Computational Social Choice and by the project …

Computing the margin of victory for various voting rules

L Xia - Proceedings of the 13th ACM conference on electronic …, 2012 - dl.acm.org
The margin of victory of an election, defined as the smallest number k such that k voters can
change the winner by voting differently, is an important measurement for robustness of the …

Multimode control attacks on elections

P Faliszewski, E Hemaspaandra… - Journal of Artificial …, 2011 - jair.org
Abstract In 1992, Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick opened the study of control attacks on elections-
--attempts to improve the election outcome by such actions as adding/deleting candidates or …

Towards a dichotomy for the possible winner problem in elections based on scoring rules

N Betzler, B Dorn - Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 2010 - Elsevier
To make a joint decision, agents (or voters) are often required to provide their preferences
as linear orders. To determine a winner, the given linear orders can be aggregated …

Dominating manipulations in voting with partial information

V Conitzer, T Walsh, L Xia - Proceedings of the AAAI conference on …, 2011 - ojs.aaai.org
We consider manipulation problems when the manipulator only has partial information
about the votes of the non-manipulators. Such partial information is described by an {\em …

[PDF][PDF] Convergence of iterative voting

O Lev, JS Rosenschein - … of the 11th International Conference on …, 2012 - cs.huji.ac.il
In multiagent systems, social choice functions can help aggregate the distinct preferences
that agents have over alternatives, enabling them to settle on a single choice. Despite the …

Complexity of and algorithms for Borda manipulation

J Davies, G Katsirelos, N Narodytska… - Proceedings of the AAAI …, 2011 - ojs.aaai.org
We prove that it is NP-hard for a coalition of two manipulators to compute how to manipulate
the Borda voting rule. This resolves one of the last open problems in the computational …