This paper reviews and proposes additional research concerning the role of publicly
reported financial accounting information in the governance processes of corporations. We …

The contracting view of CEO pay assumes that pay is used by shareholders to solve an
agency problem. Simple models of the contracting view predict that pay should not be tied to …

Historically, bubbles are followed by crashes, which in turn are followed by punitive
legislation. The 1999–2003 era is fully consistent with this pattern….(Coffee, 2003a, p. 46) …

Using the historical random assignment of MBA students to sections at Harvard Business
School (HBS), I explore how executive peer networks can affect managerial decision …

We explore how compensation policies following mergers affect a CEO's incentives to
pursue a merger. We find that even in mergers where bidding shareholders are worse off …

Principal-agent theory suggests that a manager should be paid relative to a benchmark that
removes the effect of market or sector performance on the firm's own performance. Recently …

In 1992–1993, the SEC required enhanced disclosure on executive compensation and
Congress enacted tax legislation limiting the deductibility of non-performance related …

In the 'size of stakes' view quantitatively formalised in Gabaix and Landier (Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 121 (1): 49–100, 2008), CEO compensation reflects the size of firms affected …

Over the past 20 years, there has been a dramatic increase in the share of executive
compensation paid through stock options. We examine the extent to which tax policy has …

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk‐taking. The overall net
effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk‐averse CEOs. To overcome the …