We consider a principal's choice between either controlling an agent's action through an
incomplete contract or guiding him through non-binding communication. The principal …

We examine a version of the model of Crawford and Sobel (1982) in which agents are not
biased, but their preferences are not necessarily smooth. In this situation, we show that …

We perform distributional comparative statics in a cheap talk model of adaptation. Receiver
borne adaptation costs drive a wedge between the objectives of sender and receiver that is …

This paper analyzes strategic information transition between skewed agents. More
concretely, we study Crawford and Sobel's (1982) setting in which agents are not biased, but …

Communication conflict can occur when there are misunderstandings between parties,
particularly when language or cultural differences are involved. If the conflict is not effectively …

The separation of distinct communication events relaxes incentive compatibility constraints
and, therefore, helps equalize the size of communication events. This highlights the dual …

The transmission of information is crucial for productivity and growth, but language
differences may limit its effectiveness. In this paper, I empirically investigate how the …

We consider the trade-off between imperfect control and communication in organizations. A
principal anticipates receiving private information and hires an agent to take an action for …

We analyze a class of sender-receiver games with quadratic payoffs, which includes the
communication games in Alonso et al.(2008) and Rantakari (2008) as special cases, for …