Competition, Persuasion, and Search
T Mekonnen, B Pakzad-Hurson - arXiv preprint arXiv:2411.11183, 2024 - arxiv.org
An agent engages in sequential search. He does not directly observe the quality of the
goods he samples, but he can purchase signals designed by profit maximizing principal (s) …
goods he samples, but he can purchase signals designed by profit maximizing principal (s) …
Information Design in Pandora's Problem
H Sato, R Shirakawa - Available at SSRN 4342503, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
Abstract Information plays a pivotal role in determining search behavior in many economic
situations. We examine Weitzman's (1979) ordered search model augmented with a …
situations. We examine Weitzman's (1979) ordered search model augmented with a …
Dynamic competitive persuasion
M Whitmeyer - arXiv preprint arXiv:1811.11664, 2018 - arxiv.org
Two long-lived senders play a dynamic game of competitive persuasion. Each period, each
provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we …
provides information to a single short-lived receiver. When the senders also set prices, we …
Feasible Search Behavior
H Sato, R Shirakawa - Available at SSRN, 2024 - papers.ssrn.com
Consider a situation wherein a decision maker sequentially searches for the best alternative
among heterogeneous options with an arbitrary search order. The agent partially learns the …
among heterogeneous options with an arbitrary search order. The agent partially learns the …