Iterative voting

R Meir - Trends in computational social choice, 2017 - books.google.com
In typical theoretical models of voting, all voters submit their vote at once, without an option
to change or revise their decision. While this assumption fits some political voting settings, it …

[图书][B] Strategic voting

R Meir - 2018 - books.google.com
Social choice theory deals with aggregating the preferences of multiple individuals
regarding several available alternatives, a situation colloquially known as voting. There are …

On the convergence of iterative voting: how restrictive should restricted dynamics be?

S Obraztsova, E Markakis, M Polukarov… - Proceedings of the …, 2015 - ojs.aaai.org
We study convergence properties of iterative voting procedures. Such procedures are
defined by a voting rule and a (restricted) iterative process, where at each step one agent …

Strategic voting behavior in doodle polls

J Zou, R Meir, D Parkes - Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on …, 2015 - dl.acm.org
Finding a common time slot for a group event is a daily conundrum and illustrates key
features of group decision-making. It is a complex interplay of individual incentives and …

[PDF][PDF] The echo chamber: Strategic voting and homophily in social networks

A Tsang, K Larson - … of the 2016 international conference on …, 2016 - cs.uwaterloo.ca
We propose a model where voters are embedded in a social network. Each voter observes
the ballots of her neighbors in the network, from which she infers the likely outcome of the …

Strategic voting with incomplete information

U Endriss, S Obraztsova, M Polukarov… - 2016 - eprints.soton.ac.uk
Classical results in social choice theory on the susceptibility of voting rules to strategic
manipulation make the assumption that the manipulator has complete information regarding …

[PDF][PDF] Adapting the social network to affect elections

S Sina, N Hazon, A Hassidim, S Kraus - Proceedings of the 2015 …, 2015 - Citeseer
We investigate the effect a social network could have on voting outcomes. We consider a
group of self-interested agents where each agent has a strict preference order over a set of …

Plurality voting under uncertainty

R Meir - Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial …, 2015 - ojs.aaai.org
Understanding the nature of strategic voting is the holy grail of social choice theory, where
game-theory, social science and recently computational approaches are all applied in order …

[HTML][HTML] Iterative voting and acyclic games

R Meir, M Polukarov, JS Rosenschein, NR Jennings - Artificial Intelligence, 2017 - Elsevier
Multi-agent decision problems, in which independent agents have to agree on a joint plan of
action or allocation of resources, are central to artificial intelligence. In such situations …

Computational social choice: The first ten years and beyond

H Aziz, F Brandt, E Elkind, P Skowron - … and Software Science: State of the …, 2019 - Springer
Computational social choice is a research area at the intersection of computer science,
mathematics, and economics that is concerned with aggregation of preferences of multiple …