A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver but influences the report with some
probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to …

We develop a tool akin to the revelation principle for dynamic mechanism‐selection games
in which the designer can only commit to short‐term mechanisms. We identify a canonical …

We examine persuasion when the sole source of credibility today is a desire to maintain a
public record for accuracy. A long-run sender plays a cheap talk game with a sequence of …

The central puzzle of persuasion is why a receiver would listen to a sender who they know is
trying to change their beliefs or behavior. This article summarizes five approaches to solving …

This paper characterizes optimal mediation in sender-receiver games. We assume that the
mediator's objective is to maximize the ex-ante welfare of the sender. Mediated equilibria …

This essay aims at showing that repeated games with incomplete information, which were
conceived by Aumann and Maschler in the years 1960s, provide basic tools to study …

We provide tools to analyze information design problems subject to constraints. We do so by
extending an insight by Le Treust and Tomala to the case of multiple inequality and equality …

We examine communication between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver with
a presence of a strategic fact-checker. The sender makes a claim about an issue to …

Information policies such as scores, ratings, and recommendations are increasingly shaping
society's choices in high-stakes domains. We provide a framework to study the welfare …

We study an information design problem with two informed senders and a receiver in which,
in contrast to traditional Bayesian persuasion settings, senders do not have commitment …