Bayesian analysis of linear contracts

T Alon, P Dütting, Y Li, I Talgam-Cohen - arXiv preprint arXiv:2211.06850, 2022 - arxiv.org
We provide a justification for the prevalence of linear (commission-based) contracts in
practice under the Bayesian framework. We consider a hidden-action principal-agent model …

Artificial Intelligence Clones

A Liang - arXiv preprint arXiv:2501.16996, 2025 - arxiv.org
Large language models, trained on personal data, may soon be able to mimic individual
personalities. This would potentially transform search across human candidates, including …

[PDF][PDF] Performance Feedback in Long-Run Relationships: A Rate of Convergence Approach

T Sugaya, GSB Stanford, A Wolitzky - 2023 - economics.mit.edu
In repeated principal-agent problems and games, witholding feedback about past
performance from the agent/players relaxes incentive constraints and thereby expands the …

Crowdsourcing and optimal market design

B Pakzad-Hurson - Available at SSRN 2618837, 2023 - papers.ssrn.com
Mechanisms used to derive optimal allocations are typically designed assuming agents fully
know their preferences. It is often impossible to duplicate optimal allocations when agents …

[PDF][PDF] Non-Recursive Dynamic Incentives: A Rate of Convergence Approach

T Sugaya, GSB Stanford, A Wolitzky - 2024 - economics.mit.edu
In repeated principal-agent problems and games, more outcomes are implementable when
performance signals are privately observed by a principal or mediator with commitment …