[图书][B] The normativity of rationality

B Kiesewetter - 2017 - books.google.com
Sometimes our intentions and beliefs exhibit a structure that proves us to be irrational. The
Normativity of Rationality is concerned with the question of whether we ought to avoid such …

[图书][B] Moral error theory: History, critique, defence

J Olson - 2014 - books.google.com
Jonas Olson presents a critical survey of moral error theory, the view that there are no moral
facts and so all moral claims are false. In Part I (History), he explores the historical context of …

[图书][B] Confusion of tongues: A theory of normative language

S Finlay - 2014 - books.google.com
Can normative words like" good,"" ought," and" reason" be defined in entirely non-normative
terms? Confusion of Tongues argues that they can, advancing a new End-Relational theory …

[图书][B] Impassioned belief

M Ridge - 2014 - books.google.com
Impassioned Belief presents an original expressivist theory of normative judgments.
According to his Ecumenical Expressivism normative judgements are hybrid states partly …

[图书][B] Unbelievable errors: An error theory about all normative judgements

B Streumer - 2017 - books.google.com
Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral
judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for …

Free will and the desire for suicide in mental illness

T Zürcher - Frontiers in psychiatry, 2022 - frontiersin.org
The desire to die brings about the most radical consequences that can occur in a human life.
It therefore requires a high degree of justification. Questions have been raised as to whether …

[HTML][HTML] Reasons for action: Internal vs. external

S Finlay, M Schroeder - 2008 - plato.stanford.edu
Often, when there is a reason for you to do something, it is the kind of thing to motivate you to
do it. For example, if Max and Caroline are deciding whether to go to the Alcove for dinner …

The fundamentality of fit

C Howard - Oxford studies in metaethics, 2019 - books.google.com
The recently influential “reasons-first” approach to normativity says that reasons are the
fundamental elements of the normative domain, and that all other normative facts …

Metaethical contextualism defended

G Björnsson, S Finlay - Ethics, 2010 - journals.uchicago.edu
We defend a contextualist account of normative judgments as relativized both to (i)
information and to (ii) standards or ends against recent objections that turn on practices of …

Reasons as premises of good reasoning

J Way - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 2017 - Wiley Online Library
Many philosophers have been attracted to the view that reasons are premises of good
reasoning–that reasons to φ are premises of good reasoning towards φ‐ing. However, while …