Most applications of game theory assume equilibrium, justified by presuming either that
learning will have converged to one, or that equilibrium approximates people's strategic …

This paper extends the benchmark New-Keynesian model by introducing two frictions:(i)
agent heterogeneity with incomplete markets, uninsurable idiosyncratic risk, and …

Copious laboratory and some field evidence suggests that people err in predicting others'
behavior, learning from others' actions, and best responding to their beliefs. Some of these …

We study experimentally a new two-player game: each player requests an amount between
11 and 20 shekels. He receives the requested amount and if he requests exactly one shekel …

It is standard in multiagent settings to assume that agents will adopt Nash equilibrium
strategies. However, studies in experimental economics demonstrate that Nash equilibrium …

Social interaction is both ubiquitous and central to understanding human behavior. Such
interactions depend, we argue, on shared intentionality: the parties must form a common …

In this paper, we trace four origins of agent-based computational economics (ACE), namely,
the markets origin, the cellular-automata origin, the tournaments origin, and the experiments …

In three experiments we examine the extent to which strategic sophistication (ie, inductive
reasoning, iterative dominance and level-k thinking) is determined by broader cognitive …

A new typology of players is proposed based on the classification of actions as either
instinctive or contemplative. A person's type is the probability of him choosing a …

Most of the political economy literature blames inefficient policies on institutions or
politicians' motives to supply bad policy, but voters may themselves be partially responsible …